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Abstract 
Humans across cultures have formulated rich views about what happens after death, 
including reincarnationist beliefs and beliefs in an afterlife. Theologians further 
develop and elaborate these views. Recent work in the cognitive science of religion 
suggests that afterlife beliefs are caused by psychological dispositions that are a stable 
part of human cognition. For instance, humans intuitively conceptualize themselves 
and others as composed of material and nonmaterial parts, which facilitates the idea 
that physical death is not the end of personhood. In this paper, we explore how 
psychological dispositions influence theological views of the afterlife, focusing on 
Mormon theology.  
 
1. Introduction 
Most religions affirm an explicit belief in an afterlife, i.e., that biological death is not 
the end of a human being’s existence. Recent research in the cognitive science of 
religion indicates that cross-culturally widespread beliefs in a life after death are 
cognitively natural: they arise spontaneously, without explicit instruction, and even in 
the absence of any cultural input. Humans think of the human person as consisting of 
one or more material and immaterial entities (e.g., a body and a soul, or a body, mind, 
and soul). The aim of this paper is to examine how theological views on the afterlife 
are influenced by evolved cognitive dispositions. We start out by reviewing theories 
in the cognitive science of religion on afterlife beliefs, looking at different 
psychological dispositions that contribute to such beliefs, with a focus on intuitive 
concepts of personhood. We then examine Mormon theological views of the afterlife, 
and trace their origins to evolved features of human psychology.  
 
2. Cognitive theories on afterlife beliefs 
Human cultures exhibit a wide variety of beliefs about what happens to people after 
they die. Some religions, such as traditional Shinto, classical paganism, and Judaism, 
do not provide an elaborate belief in an afterlife, but conceptualize a vague and 
indeterminate place (Yomi, Hades, Sheol) where people continue to exist after death 
as a shadow of their former selves. Other religions, such as the traditional beliefs of 
the Trobriand Islands and Hinduism, propose that humans and other creatures 
reincarnate into new bodies in a cyclical pattern of death and rebirth, perhaps ending 
by being absorbed into a universal consciousness. Yet other religions, such as Islam 
and Christianity, picture a rich and elaborate afterlife, in a pleasant park-like 
environment (Heaven) or in a horrible place of torment (Hell).  
In spite of this diversity, there are cross-cultural similarities. Humans are not, 
by default, materialist monists. They believe that some non-physical part(s) of the 
human person continue to exist after death. This is remarkable, since even 
preschoolers realize that the biological death of an organism, such as a pet, is 
irreversible, and that it permanently ends its biological functions (Barrett & Behne 
2005). Even in contemporary western culture, with its monist scientific picture of 
human personhood, the majority of people continue to believe in some postmortem 
existence. How can we explain the ubiquity of afterlife beliefs, given that there is no 
clear empirical evidence for life after death? We propose that afterlife beliefs have 
multiple causal factors, and will here consider some of them1. These dispositions 
explain why such beliefs are widespread, and can account for some of the different 
forms they can take. 
 
2.1 Humans are not intuitive physicalists (although it is unclear what they 
are) 
A wealth of research indicates that humans do not equate personhood with the 
physical body. In a series of experiments, Bering and Bjorklund (2004) demonstrated 
that young children draw an intuitive distinction between the biological functions of an 
organism (which cease at death) and its psychological properties (which they believe 
continue after death). Children aged between four and eight saw a puppet show where 
an alligator ate a mouse.  After witnessing this event, the experimenter said “Well, it 
looks like Brown Mouse got eaten by Mr. Alligator. Brown Mouse is not alive 
anymore” (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004, 220). When prompted, the vast majority of 
participants agreed the mouse was dead. They were then asked whether it could still 
perform biological functions (e.g., eat, run) and whether it still had psychological 
functions (e.g., knowing it’s not alive, wanting to go home). While preschoolers 
realized that the biological functions had ceased, they believed that psychological 
functions continued, for instance, that the mouse would still love its mommy. This 
tendency decreased somewhat in the older children, suggesting that this belief was not 
a result of cultural learning, where we expect see the opposite pattern.  
More recently, Emmons and Kelemen (2014) found that children from Ecuador 
aged five to twelve, drawn from the rural indigenous Shuar and a more urban 
population, hold an intuitive belief in pre-existence, i.e., they believe they existed 
before their mothers were pregnant with them. Participants were asked if they could 
feel, know, and think things before their mothers were pregnant with them. Whereas 
older children realized they were not bodily present prior to their biological conception, 
they still attributed desires and emotions to their pre-conception selves. Since prelife 
beliefs are not part of the belief systems of rural and urban Ecuador populations (who 
are predominantly Roman Catholic), this finding supports the view that belief in 
personal continuity before and after one’s physical lifespan is not a result of cultural 
learning. Similarly, Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005) found that young children believe their 
friend and God existed in the time of the dinosaurs and would never die, but by the 
time they are age five, they realize only God is eternal, whereas their friend was not 
around in the time of the dinosaurs and would die at some point.  
 Bloom (2004, 2007) has argued that belief in the continuity of mental states 
after death is the result of an intuitive dualism. We have different cognitive 
mechanisms for dealing with bodies and for dealing with minds. Our reasoning about 
bodies is governed by intuitive physics (thinking about the motions of bodies in space), 
whereas our thinking about minds is subserved by intuitive psychology (thinking 
about beliefs, desires, and other mental states, and how they relate to behavior). Since 
these two systems are independent, it is possible to attribute mental states to someone 
whose body has deceased, e.g., when selling grandfather’s house, the fact that 
																																																								
1 We focus here on individual cognitive dispositions. For reasons of scope and space, 
we will not discuss group selectionist theories on supernatural punishment, which 
propose that belief in supernatural punishment after death is a group-level adaptation 
that helps people cooperate better (see e.g., Shariff & Rhemtulla 2012). 
grandfather would not have liked this can come vividly to mind even years after his 
demise. Bloom (2007, 217) argues that the cultural transmission of afterlife beliefs 
builds on this unlearned, intuitive dualism, “while we have to learn the specific sort of 
afterlife that people in our culture believe in (heaven, reincarnation, spirit world, and 
so on), the notion that consciousness is separable from the body is not learned at all; it 
comes for free.” 
 One difficulty with this account of an innate psychological dualism is that it 
does not seem to be the default position in all religions, as judged from afterlife 
beliefs. In many religions (e.g., ancient Egypt, Taoism), humans have not one but 
several souls (Hodge, 2008). Many religions practice the giving of grave gifts, which 
would be unintelligible if belief in disembodied minds were universal. Other 
traditions (e.g., Christianity, Islam) hold that people will have a body in the afterlife, 
e.g., the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) states that God will “judge the living and the 
dead ... All of them will rise with their own bodies, which they now have,” 
reiterating what Christian theologians have maintained since the second century. The 
resurrection of the body has been a central belief in Christianity for centuries.  
 Another difficulty with the view that intuitive dualism is directly causally 
responsible for afterlife beliefs is that judgments about an agent’s psychological 
continuity beyond death are sensitive to context (Astuti & Harris 2005). People are 
more likely to attribute such continuity if they hear about the deceased in a religious 
context (e.g., a religious funeral) than in a secular context (e.g., a hospital setting). 
Among westerners, belief in the soul is more prevalent among adults than among 
children, whereas belief in the afterlife remains more constant throughout life 
(Anglin, in press). If afterlife beliefs were caused by an intuitive body-soul dualism, 
one would expect that soul beliefs were as strong as afterlife beliefs in childhood, 
and that there would be a stronger correlation between these beliefs across cultures.  
 There are alternative accounts to intuitive dualism. Hodge (2011, in press) 
argues that our offline social reasoning (i.e., imagining what others might be doing or 
how they would react, especially while they are not present) requires us to imagine 
people as embodied and spatially located. When one reasons about someone who is 
not physically present, one uses theory of mind as well as some representation of 
salient bodily features (especially those that are important for social interactions, 
such as the face) to imagine that person. For instance, when Sally thinks of her 
grandfather in Florida, she imagines him sitting on the porch with grandma, and what 
he would say or think about her decisions. When he is dead (rather than just far 
away), she uses the same off-line social reasoning to imagine what he would think of 
her decision to study architecture rather than medicine. This form of cognition 
sometimes involves thinking about the other person’s bodily states, which may 
explain why in popular culture, ghosts (deceased people) are still represented as 
having a body, albeit an insubstantial one. According to Hodge, our capacities for 
social reasoning make us intuitively conceptualize death as a change in location, 
rather than the termination of a person. In line with this finding, Gray et al. (2011) 
found that adult participants think that a person who is in a permanent vegetative 
state (PVS) has less abilities than a person who is deceased, for instance, a person 
who is dead still has emotions and feelings, someone in PVS not—after all, the 
patient in PVS is “stuck” in our world, whereas the dead have agency in the afterlife.  
 Other authors (e.g., Richert & Harris 2008, Roazzi et al. 2013) have argued 
for complex intuitive conceptions of personhood, which involve not just a body and a 
mind, but also a soul and a spirit. For example, whereas both body and mind change 
over time, westerners believe the soul does not change to the same extent. Richert 
and Harris (2006) found that western children believe baptism changes a baby’s soul 
but not its mind or body. In Indonesia, the United States, and Brazil, the spirit is 
associated with passions, whereas the mind is linked to cognitive abilities. The more 
religious participants are, the more they find the soul important for cognitive, moral, 
social and bodily abilities (Roazzi et al. 2013). These studies suggest that our 
intuitive views of personhood are complex—we are not intuitive monists, but no 
intuitive substance dualists either.  
 
2.2 Death as unimaginable 
Philosophers, especially in the continental tradition, have argued that it is impossible 
to think of oneself as not existing, and that it is also very hard to imagine that others 
have ceased permanently. This might contribute to the formation of afterlife beliefs. 
As Merleau-Ponty observed, it is not possible to imagine one’s own death,  
 
Neither my birth nor my death can appear to me as experiences of my 
own, since, if I thought of them thus, I should be assuming myself to 
be pre-existent to, or outliving, myself, in order to be able to 
experience them, and I should therefore not be genuinely thinking of 
my birth or my death. I can, then, apprehend myself only as ‘already 
born’ and ‘still alive’—I can apprehend my birth and my death only as 
prepersonal horizons: I know that people are born and die, but I 
cannot know my own birth and death (Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945], 
250). 
 
Heidegger (1996 [1953], 236-246) considered that we can indirectly experience 
death through the death of others. But this falls short of having phenomenological 
access to one’s own death, since we can still experience the feeling of loss of the 
other, still see their corpse, etc.  What we cannot experience is the end of ourselves—
it is literally unimaginable. Even though we are certain we will die, this realization is 
not part of our lived experience. It is possible to imagine one’s own death as an event 
in the world, but not that one’s experiences will come to an end, or differently put, “I 
can’t imagine from the first person perspective that I don’t exist” (Nichols, 2007, 
219). 
Even imagining the death of others, it turns out, is hard and requires cognitive 
effort. Bering (2002) presented stories where the protagonist died unexpectedly.  
Adult participants were asked whether the character could still feel hungry, think 
about his wife, etc. Those who believed people cease permanently at death took 
longer to answer individual questions about the protagonist’s abilities than those who 
believed in an afterlife. Answering “no” to an epistemic question (e.g., “Can the 
protagonist still think about his wife?”) took twice as long as responding 
affirmatively. Participants who believed there was no afterlife also made more 
frequent errors answering the questionnaire. Bering concludes that it is easier to 
imagine someone’s continued existence than someone’s death, and that it requires 
conscious effort to override these intuitive expectations.   
 The inability to imagine one’s own cessation, and the diminished ability to 
represent the death of others explains a number of cross-cultural features of afterlife 
beliefs. It explains why afterlife beliefs are cross-culturally widespread, even in 
cultures where such beliefs are not elaborated and where the hereafter is hardly an 
attractive place, e.g., Sheol, where the dead live an indistinct existence: “a living dog 
is better than a dead lion. The living know that they will die, but the dead know 
nothing; they have no more reward, and even the memory of them is lost” 
(Ecclesiastes 9:4-52). In a place like Sheol, a dead person endures a minimalistic 
existence. The inability to imagine oneself as dead contributes to an intuitive 
eternalism—our intuitive conceptualization of persons as persisting throughout time. 
This intuitive eternalism does not force us to believe in an afterlife—it is after all still 
possible to think about one’s own non-existence in the third person (see Nichols, 
2007)—but facilitates belief life after death, and may promote the cultural 
transmission of afterlife beliefs.  
 
2.3 Mental time travel and positive prospection3 
All neurotypical adults have the ability to mentally simulate past, future, and 
alternative situations. This capacity, termed mental time travel or prospection, allows 
us to project ourselves into the future in order to consider possible future scenarios. 
A core brain network underlies both our capacity to remember personal experiences 
and to imagining future scenarios (Buckner & Carroll 2007). This brain network is 
specialized in “scene construction”, the production of detailed and spatial 
representations (Hassabis & Maguire 2007). In one study, people with hippocampal 
damage who had amnesia about personal past events and normal control participants 
were asked to imagine pretty straightforward scenarios (e.g., “Imagine you are lying 
on a white tropical beach in a beautiful sandy bay”). Controls could easily come up 
with vivid descriptions, imagining the sun on their skin and the surf on their feet, 
whereas the amnesic patients had difficulties simulating any kind of perceptual 
experience (one patient said “The only thing I see is blue”) (Hassabis et al. 2007).  
Although the brain mechanisms of remembering the past and imagining the 
future are quite similar, there is one important functional difference: remembering 
the past is constrained by reality checks (neurotypical people are not serial 
confabulators like baron von Münchhausen) in a way that future prospection is not. 
Consistently, across studies, it turns out that people picture their future in optimistic 
terms: they believe they will be happier, fill in their tax forms more quickly, or make 
more money, even if there are no compelling reasons to believe so (see van Boven et 
al. 2008 for review).  In line with this biased episodic future thinking, one would 
expect that more rosy pictures of the afterlife would enjoy greater cultural success. 
This is a consistent finding. For instance, of the US adult population, 74% believes in 
a life after death; the same percentage believes in Heaven, but only 59% believes in 
Hell, and even the majority of surveyed adults who believe in Hell are confident they 
will go to Heaven4.   
Given the importance of spatial imagery for prospection of future events, one 
can expect that the most culturally successful afterlife beliefs will be those that 
provide a detailed, vivid, and concrete visuospatial representation of the locations 
where this life is led. Representations of paradise tap into an evolved and cross-
culturally attested preference for park-like landscapes. It is no coincidence that many 
conceptions of the afterlife resemble lush gardens, e.g., for Muslims and Jehovah’s 
witnesses. These conceptions match the preference for landscapes attested in 
experimental aesthetics: regardless of their actual surroundings, people prefer 
environments with some trees, grassland, water, and non-threatening wildlife (Orians 
																																																								
2 All bible citations are from the NRSV. 
3 This section draws from Emmons and De Cruz (manuscript) 
4 http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2religious-landscape-study-key-findings.pdf   
& Heerwagen 1992). Yet because afterlife beliefs also have to match existing 
cultural ideas and practices, they exhibit cross-cultural variability in how they are 
concretely visualized. Jade palaces are foretold in China, eternal hunting grounds in 
Native American Plains societies, and lakes full of fat fish in Saami (Scandinavia) 
culture (Nähri 2008). Afterlife beliefs exemplify culturally variable conceptions of 
what counts as desirable. To Vikings, Walhalla was a golden hall where warriors 
could indulge in brawls, rich food, and alcoholic beverages. The Ojibwe (Native 
American Plains culture) envisage rich hunting grounds where large game hunting is 
risk-free and always successful, 
 
where the souls find amusement, dancing and game in abundance … No 
need to get tired hunting; the best game lets itself be taken without 
pursuit. The soul of the Indian strikes down the soul of the moose and 
takes the best pieces of venison, after which the moose gets up 
unharmed, and starts grazing again (Moon Conard 1901, 76-77).  
 
Mormonism has an elaborate conception of the afterlife, which does not only 
promise the continuation of the individual after death, but also that of existing social 
relationships: families are reunited in a beautiful environment, and one can expect to 
spend eternity with one’s loved ones (Davies 2000, chapter 3, see also section 3.2).   
   
2.4 Death anxiety 
Psychologists (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1986) and anthropologists (e.g., Malinowski, 
1948, 29-30) have long speculated that fear of death promotes religious belief, but 
empirical evidence for this claim has only been gathered in the last few decades. For 
example, reminding participants of their own mortality makes them more prone to 
accept creationism and less willing to endorse evolutionary theory (Tracy et al. 2011). 
Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) found that mortality primes (e.g., a story recounting 
the tragic death of a boy in a car accident) not only increased belief in God, but also 
in religious beings that were less culturally salient for the Christian participants, such 
as the Buddha and shamanic spirits. Jong et al. (2012) used two types of measures to 
examine the effects of priming mortality on religious and non-religious participants, 
by first asking them about what they thought would happen if they were dead, and 
then querying them about their belief in supernatural beings, such as God. Mortality 
priming increased belief in supernatural beings in religious participants and 
decreased it in non-religious subjects. However, when belief in supernatural beings 
was measured implicitly, by asking them to sort, as quickly as possible, words like 
“angel” and “god” as either imaginary or real, both theists and nontheists sorted more 
supernatural beings in the real category when primed with mortality.  
In spite of this empirical support, many cognitive scientists of religion have 
criticized the view that fear of death causally contributes to afterlife beliefs (e.g., 
Boyer, 2002, 236–237). For one thing, afterlives are not uniformly wonderful places; 
some conceptualize it as a gloomy place where the spirits of the deceased reside, e.g., 
Yomi in Shintoism, where the dead are in a perpetual state of decomposition. A 
particularly grim picture of the afterlife comes from Vanuatu (Oceania): 
 
The life in Wies [the hereafter] is not a particularly pleasant one, it 
seems. The king of this land of the dead is a being called Anrum 
Mbwilei, who was himself never a living person. He stands in the 
centre of the village dancing ground in Wies and beats the gongs. He 
beats them so hard that he excretes continually. His excrement is the 
food of the dead, but ghosts may escape having to eat it by bringing 
with them from the land of the living the rotten stump of an Erythrina 
tree (Deacon, 1934, 556). 
 
However, if afterlife beliefs have multiple causal factors, as we propose, one 
would expect that not all afterlife beliefs help to cope with death anxiety, but that 
some of them do. Monotheistic religions offer a prospect of Heaven; many 
reincarnationist religions (e.g., Buddhism, Hinduism) foresee an end to the cycle of 
death and rebirth in a universal consciousness (e.g., Nirvana). In a study of older 
western adults, religiosity was one of the independent variables that predicted a lower 
fear of annihilation (Cicirelli, 2002). Note that afterlife beliefs typically do not 
eradicate death anxiety and existential questions about life after death—these 
problems remain present to some extent, as is evident in the fact that sincere believers 
try to avoid getting killed just like nonbelievers. Martyrs (e.g., in early Christianity) 
and suicide terrorists, who cheerfully meet their deaths seem to be in the minority. The 
replacement of religious beliefs with others that offer more pleasant afterlives, as for 
example, in historic times the replacement of tribal religions in Vanuatu with 
Christianity (which offers the prospect of Heaven rather than eating excrements), and 
the replacement of Shinto death rituals with Buddhist funerals in Japan (continued 
decomposition versus reincarnation or Nirvana) speaks to the fact that people expect a 
pleasant rather than an unpleasant afterlife (see also previous section).  
 
3. The problem of personal identity in theological resurrection accounts 
 
3.1 Folk and theological concepts of the afterlife 
As we have seen, ordinary cognitive constraints and processes influence the 
development of afterlife beliefs across cultures. They make human minds receptive to 
the idea of a postmortem existence. The idea of immortality has also been explored in 
theology. The question of how persons are able to survive physical death has been the 
focus of intense theological discussion. Already in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians 
(15: 35) skeptics question the resurrection of the dead: “How are the dead raised? 
With what kind of body do they come?” Similarly, in the Qur’an5 (17:49), doubters of 
the Muslim resurrection doctrine muse: “When we are turned to bones and dust, shall 
we really be raised up in a new act of creation?” What these skeptics allude to is the 
problem of personal identity: how can I still be “me” in the afterlife, given that my 
body gets destroyed (rots, burns, etc.) after death?  
In accordance with scripture, the accepted Christian doctrine predicts a 
universal bodily resurrection. However, as scripture does not specify in detail what 
happens to people after they die, there has been considerable debate on how humans 
can survive their physical death. For example, while biblical texts foretell a bodily 
resurrection and a final judgment for everyone, they do not relate in detail how these 
events will take place, nor do they specify what happens to us in the time between the 
death of our physical bodies and the Day of Judgment. Does the soul remain in an 
intermediate state, separate from the body, prior to its unification with a renewed 
body? Is there a temporal gap in our existence, until we are recreated, as bodies, at the 
end of times? Such discussions continue among contemporary philosophers who work 
																																																								
5 Translated by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (2004, Oxford University Press).  
on the personal identity problem, for instance, from a physicalist or dualist 
perspective on human personhood (e.g., van Inwagen 1978 [1998], Zimmerman 2010). 
 We have argued elsewhere (e.g., De Cruz & De Smedt 2015, De Cruz 2014), 
that theologians and philosophers of religion are not immune to the cognitive 
dispositions that give rise to religious beliefs in laypeople. Theologians build on the 
intuitive views that laypeople have, typically by making such views more explicit. A 
key difference between theology and ordinary beliefs is that theologians—like other 
scholars—aim to be more consistent than laypeople typically are. It is quite common 
for believers to have religious views that are mildly inconsistent, and for them to be 
unaware of these inconsistencies. For example, in a qualitative study of afterlife 
beliefs of a small sample of British Christians (Congregationalists), Armstrong (2011) 
found that laypeople tend to believe they (and others) go immediately to Heaven after 
death. There is no mention of an intermediary state (between death and the general 
resurrection of the dead, such as a soul sleep) or about the Last Judgment. They 
explicitly say they are disembodied after death, e.g., “the spirit or the soul lives on”, 
“the spirit leaves the body and goes” (Armstrong 2011, 100). The physical 
resurrection of Jesus was described by one interviewee as “a one-off” (Armstrong 
2011, 101), mainly as a way to prove his divinity rather than as a template for the 
general resurrection. Yet, at the same time, they thought they would hear and see, and 
have things to do in the afterlife, implying some form of physicality.  
 As we have seen, humans have the cognitive tendency not only to believe in 
an afterlife, but also to hold a more general form of eternalism—we find it easy and 
intuitive to think of ourselves and others not just as having an afterlife, but also a 
prelife existence. Since young children from cultures that do not have a formal belief 
in a prelife spontaneously form prelife beliefs, it is unsurprising that such beliefs have 
emerged in western traditions as well. In Americans who do not formally identify 
with a religious affiliation but are spiritual seekers, there is a widespread belief in 
reincarnation: people believe they have lived before, and draw existential meaning 
from memories they say they have of their previous lives (White et al., in press). 
Belief in reincarnation has emerged independently multiple times (e.g., Trobriand 
Islanders, Oceania, the West-African Beng, and Hinduism). Still, prelife beliefs are 
rarer than afterlife beliefs. There are more motivating factors to believe in an afterlife 
than to believe in a prelife existence, which probably causes this asymmetry. People 
miss the dead, but not those who were never born; they fear death, but as the 
Epicureans already observed, do not fear their prelife lack of existence; they are 
constrained by reality in their episodic memories, but not in their projections of the 
future (Emmons & De Cruz, manuscript).   
Intuitive eternalism (both about prelife and afterlife) can potentially conflict 
with intuitive biology: from about four years of age, young children across cultures 
understand that death means the cessation of agency and all biological processes, and 
they can distinguish death from sleep (Barrett & Behne 2005). At around the same 
age, young children understand some aspects of reproduction and inheritance, for 
instance, that cats give birth to kittens and dogs to puppies (Johnson et al. 1997), and 
they can make inferences about heritable traits, for instance, that a goat, raised by 
foster kangaroo parents, will climb, rather than hop (Gelman & Wellman 1991). They 
understand that birth is the event through which young animals come into existence. 
Whereas intuitive biology predicts a start and an end to animal and human lives, 
intuitive eternalism predisposes us to think that human existence extends into the past 
and the future. One straightforward way to resolve this tension is to endorse that 
biological processes end, while maintaining that some non-material part (soul or 
spirit) continues to exist. But this form of dualism is at odds with our intuitive 
tendency to attribute physical features and capacities to the dead. Tensions like these 
need to be resolved in any theological system of the afterlife. Inevitably, in order to 
obtain a consistent system, theologians need to introduce counterintuitive elements. In 
our case study (next subsection) Mormon theologians have introduced a far-reaching 
monism, and combined this with an intuitive eternalist stance.  
Why do theologians try to make internally consistent views? Internal 
consistency becomes especially important when defending one’s views against those 
of others, but is less important for privately held beliefs that are typically not subject 
to debate. Mercier and Sperber (2011) propose that checking the coherence of a 
message is an important way to assess information we receive from others. Thus, 
theologians have to make explicit in a coherent manner what happens to the body, 
soul and mind when someone dies, and how a person can survive her physical death. 
In the next subsection, we look at how Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) view the 
afterlife, and how they attempt to provide a coherent solution to the question of what 
happens after death.  
 
3.2. Mormonism: Physicalist monism and eternalism 
Mormon theology came to a markedly different solution compared to mainstream 
Christianity (from which it evolved), in that it embraces both a prelife existence and a 
monism about souls and gods. Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, contributed substantially to the distinctive Mormon 
theology of prelife and afterlife. In 1839, he publicly rejected the idea of creatio ex 
nihilo and argued that humans exist eternally and necessarily: “The Spirit of Man is 
not a created being; it existed from Eternity and will exist to eternity. Anything 
created cannot be eternal, and earth, water &c—all these had their existence in an 
elementary state from Eternity” (cited in Ostler, 1982, 61). In the Book of Abraham 
(1842), he described humans as intelligences that have existed eternally, and that 
could progress to become like God.  
Because of Smith’s untimely assassination, many Mormon theological views 
remained poorly fleshed out. The Mormon theology about prelife and afterlife was 
mainly developed by Parley Parker Pratt in his essays Materiality (1845) and The 
immortality and eternal life of the material body (1844) (see Park & Watkins 2010, 
for discussion). In these essays, Pratt explicitly argued that “man’s body is as eternal 
as his soul, or his spirit” (cited in Park & Watkins 2010, 161). In his view, materiality 
is equivalent to existence: spirits, angels, and God are material and embodied. 
Immateriality means the same as non-existence. Throughout this radical physicalist 
monism, there is no ontological divide between the mind and the body, or between 
God, spirits, and humanity. God has a human (male) body, and humans can progress 
to become like God. Angels have material bodies too. Spirits are also material, but 
their material substance is less tangible to our senses. They are humans waiting to be 
born:  
 
What are Spirits? They are material organizations, intelligences, 
possessing body and parts in the likeness of the temporal body; but not 
composed of flesh and bones, but of some substance less tangable to 
our gross senses in our present life; but tangable to those in the same 
element as themselves. In short they are men in embrio—Intelligences 
waiting to come into the natural world and take upon them flesh and 
bones, that through birth, death, and the resurrection they may also be 
perfected in the material organization. Such was Jesus Christ, and such 
were we before we came into this world, and such we will be again, in 
the intervening space between death and the resurrection (Pratt, 1845 
[2010], 165). 
 
Spirits are uncreated and co-eternal with God. The difference between 
intelligent beings (God, angels, humans, spirits) is in the nature and state of their 
current embodiment. Pratt saw the afterlife as a place where humans would continue 
in a physical state, eating, drinking, conversing, walking, and playing musical 
instruments. The idea of an eternal existence of humankind dovetails well with the 
Mormon concept of eternal progression, i.e., that humans will ultimately become 
gods: there is no intrinsic ontological distinction between humans and God, but 
mainly a distinction in stage of development. The majority of Mormons believe that 
eventually (almost) everyone progresses to the level of God. Gods are (will be) 
embodied, and thus still resemble us in appearance and actions.   
 This theology elegantly solves the problem of how we survive our physical 
deaths: upon birth, physical intelligences acquire flesh and bones, which they shed 
again after death. After the resurrection, the postmortem life looks very much like our 
life on Earth, and can thus be easily imagined. Also, Mormonism resonates with our 
intuitive eternalist tendencies by not only mapping out a detailed afterlife, but also a 
prelife existence as spirits. The idea that one has a life prior to the present one is, of 
course, not unique to Mormonism, but it is rare in Christian and post-Christian 
thought. Origen was one of the few Christian theologians who held that human souls 
were created prior to the biological conception; this position was declared anathema 
during the Synod of Constantinople (543).  
 Not only does the Mormon concept of the afterlife promise a continuation of 
life as we know it (but for the eternal progression, which is a long-term project), it 
also preserves social relationships after death, including marital relationships and 
parent-child bonds. Latter-Day Saints couples can opt to get “sealed”, next to being 
married, which perpetuates their relationship after death. By contrast, in mainstream 
Christianity, marriages end at death and there are no postmortem marital relationships 
(Matthew 22:30). Across cultures, people need to come to terms with the tension 
between their continued social reasoning about dead persons, and their inability to 
interact with them. As we have seen, humans do not make a distinction between 
living and dead persons—it is natural to continue to attribute mental states to and 
have social interactions with the deceased. For instance, in New Ireland (Melanesia), 
after a mourning period, anthropomorphic sculptures are displayed to channel the 
social identity of the recently deceased. The sculptures are destroyed or left to rot, 
which severs the social ties between the living and the dead. This allows survivors to 
continue life without the deceased, and turns the dead person into an ancestor, 
someone who is no longer part of the social fabric of the living (Küchler 1992, Gell 
1998). The Mormon view of the afterlife is more in line with functional properties of 
our intuitive social reasoning by its refusal to sever the ties between the living and the 
dead. According to Davies (2000, chapter 3), Mormonism owes its beginning to some 
extent to this attractive social view of the afterlife. Indeed, Joseph Smith was deeply 
struck and saddened by the death of his beloved brother, Alvin, whom he later saw in 
a vision residing in the celestial kingdom (the highest of the three Mormon heavens).  
Latter-Day Saints also assume that humans are begotten (in a biological sense) 
by God (Heavenly Father) and the elusive Heavenly Mother. While this view accords 
well with intuitive biological concepts of reproduction, it is in tension with their 
eternalist beliefs. How can people be eternal intelligences, and also be the biological 
offspring of divine parents? One solution to this problem is that uncreated 
intelligences are re-organized through the spiritual birth from divine parents. However, 
this solution is not generally accepted in Mormon theology, and the details of the 
spiritual birth have yet to be fleshed out (Ostler 1982). Mormonism is a recent 
offshoot of Christianity which capitalizes on a number of intuitive tendencies, 
including intuitive eternalism, intuitive biology, and imagining the afterlife as 
embodied, but it is still struggling to unite these in a coherent theological framework.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this essay, we have examined the relationship between intuitive afterlife beliefs and 
theological concepts of the hereafter. We have shown that several cognitive 
dispositions render the idea of an afterlife plausible. These include an intuitive 
conception of personhood as more than just material entity, the tendency to think of 
persons as eternal, the inability to imagine oneself and others as dead, and an 
optimistic bias in mental time travel. These cognitive dispositions influence 
theological views of life after death, as we illustrated with Mormon theological 
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